Secret
American diplomatic dispatches, spread over 21,000 pages, have provided
previously unknown information about the Nigerian Civil War
File photo
Early in the morning of 1 July 1967, Nigeria’s young head of state,
Colonel Yakubu Gowon, was feeling uneasy in his office at the Supreme
Headquarters, Dodan Barracks in Lagos. The unease was a result of his
being ceaselessly pressured to authorize a military invasion of the
breakaway Republic of Biafra.
Thirty officers had been recalled from courses abroad. Trains and
truck convoys, bearing fuel, supplies and men, were still leaving Kano
and Kaduna for the south of River Benue.
Colonel Mohammed Shuwa of the First Area Command had moved his
command headquarters southwards and set it up in Makurdi. The 2nd
Battalion was already headquartered in Adikpo. Schools and private homes
had been commandeered for the use of Major Sule Apollo and his 4th
Battalion in Oturkpo. They were itching for action. The same day, Major
B.M. Usman “a member of the intimate northern group around Gowon” told
the American defense attaché: “I do not know what in hell he is waiting
for; the boys are all ready to go. They are only waiting on his word.”
Members of the Supreme Military Council, who had been meeting twice
daily, were waiting for his word. The whole nation was waiting. Biafra,
which was on high alert, was also waiting.
On 27 June 1967, Cyprian Ekwensi, famous writer and Biafra’s
Director of Information Service, through the Voice of Biafra (formerly
Enugu Radio), urged Biafrans to be prepared for an invasion on June 29
since “Northerners have often struck on 29th day of the month.” He was
alluding to the day northern officers, led by Major T.Y. Danjuma, seized
Gowon’s predecessor, Major- General Aguiyi-Ironsi, and killed him in a
forest outside Ibadan.
Gowon, then 31, had been running the affairs of 57million Nigerians
for 10 months. It had not been easy. Chief Obafemi Awolowo, his 58-year
old trusted deputy and adviser, was with Okoi Arikpo and Philip Asiodu,
permanent secretaries of the ministries of External Affairs and Trade
and Industries respectively.
They were preparing to put the noose on the neck of the Anglo-Dutch
oil giant, Shell-BP, which had frozen royalty payments due to the
Federation Account on 1 June 1967 and had offered to pay the Biafran
government £250,000.
Lieutenant Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, Biafran leader, had ordered all
oil companies to start paying all royalties to Enugu because they were
operating in a new country or risk heavy penalties.
Specifically, he demanded a minimum of £2million from Shell-BP. The
Federal Government had imposed an economic blockade on Biafra. It
entailed barring all merchant vessels and sea tankers from sailing to
and from Koko, Warri, Sapele, Escravos, Bonny, Port Harcourt, Calabar
ports, which Ojukwu had declared part and parcel of Biafra.
Biafra controlled the land on which the oil installations sat; the
Nigerian government controlled the coastal entrance and exit to those
lands. Shell-BP was confused as to whose order should be obeyed. Sir
David Hunt, the British High Commissioner to Nigeria, told his American
counterpart after the meeting with the Nigerian delegation: “Awolowo is
very firmly in control of Ministry of Finance and he is giving Stanley
Gray, Shell’s General Manager and other experts from London a very
difficult time for the past three days.” They persuaded Awolowo to
accept a deal that would favour the Nigerian government and, at the same
time, would predispose oil workers and the £150million investment to
danger in the hands of Biafran military forces. Awolowo refused, arguing
that anything short of the status quo was recognition of Biafra and
concession to the rebels. As for security of investments and personnel,
he argued that once royalties were paid, the Nigerian government would
have the capacity to fund whatever action it would take on the rebels
and Shell-BP’s investments would be safe.
Gowon paced to the large outdated map of the country by the door to
his office. When he asked Awolowo to come and join his government,
Awolowo said he would accept only if Gowon did something about the
dominance of North over the rest of the nation. A month before, Gowon
had broken up the North into six states, but the map by the door still
showed the old Nigeria, with an imposing North at the top. He ran his
finger around the boundaries of Biafra and asked himself: “How can I
authorize an invasion of my own people?” He knew what it meant to be
resented. He was not the most senior officer in the army. He was not a
Muslim Hausa or Fulani from Kano, Kaduna or Sokoto. He was a Christian
from one of the small minorities that dot the North and yet, events had
promoted him to the position of the Head of State and
Commander-in-Chief–to the chagrin of many northern officers,
politicians, and emirs.
He knew the Igbo were resented in the North for succeeding where
indigenes had failed. His Igbo lover, Edith Ike, told him her life was
threatened twice in Lagos since she returned from the North in March.
According to the secret US document of 1 July 1967, Edith’s
parents, having lived in the North for 30 years, where she too was born,
had fled back to the East in October 1966 because of that year’s
massacre of the Igbo. Not 30,000 but around 7,000 were killed, according
to the American documents. Donald Patterson of the Political Section
and Tom Smith of the Economic Section travelled from the US Embassy in
Lagos to the North after the pogrom. “The Sabon-Garis were ghost towns,
deserted, with the detritus of people, who had fled rapidly, left
behind. Most Northerners we talked to had no apologies for what had
happened to the Ibos, for the pogrom that had killed so many. There were
exceptions, but in general, there was no remorse and the feeling was
one of good riddance.
“One day, our Hausa gardener attacked and tried to beat up our Ibo
cook. We fired the gardener, but not long afterwards, the cook left for
the East,” said Patterson.
Earlier that week, Gowon called the West German Ambassador in
Lagos. The Germans were eager to be in the good graces of the Gowon
administration. A war loomed. And in wars, buildings, roads, bridges,
and other infrastructure are destroyed. These would need rebuilding. The
contract for the 2nd Mainland Bridge (later called Eko Bridge) was
signed two years earlier by the Ambassador, CEO of Julius Berger Tiefbau
AG and Shehu Shagari, Federal Commissioner for Works and Survey. That
was Julius Berger’s first contract in Nigeria. It was due for completion
in less than two years and they wanted more bilateral cooperation. The
ambassador assured Gowon over the phone that he had taken care of all
the details and guaranteed the safety of Edith, the nation’s “First
Girlfriend”.
On the evening of 30 June, just before her departure on a
commercial airline, Edith told the American Defense Attaché Standish
Brooks, and his wife, Gail, that she actually wanted to go to the UK or
USA, but Jack, as she affectionately called Gowon, insisted that she
could be exposed to danger in either of the two countries. Germany, he
reasoned, would be safer.
To Major B.M. Usman and other northern officers around Gowon, who
had attributed his slow response to the secession to the fact that his
girlfriend was Igbo and that her parents were resettled in the East, it
was such a huge relief that at the Supreme Military Council meeting of 3
July 1967, Gowon authorized the long awaited military campaign.
Edith had safely landed in West Germany. Gowon told the gathering:
“Gentlemen, we are going to crush the rebellion, but note that we are
going after the rebels, not the Ibos.” The military action, which was to
become the Nigerian Civil War or the Biafran War or Operation Unicord,
as it was coded in military circles, officially started on 6 July 1967
at 5 a.m.
The North was minded to use the war as a tool to reassert its
dominance of national affairs. Mallam Kagu, Damboa, Regional Editor of
the Morning Post, told the American consul in Kaduna: “No one should kid
himself that this is a fight between the East and the rest of Nigeria.
It is a fight between the North and the Ibo.” He added that the rebels
would be flushed out of Enugu within six weeks. Lt. Colonel Hassan
Katsina went further to say with the level of enthusiasm among the
soldiers; it would be a matter of “only hours before Ojukwu and his men
were rounded up”.
The northern section of the Nigerian military was the best equipped
in the country. To ensure the region’s continued dominance, the British
assigned most of the army and air force resources to the North. It was
only the Navy’s they could not transfer. All the elite military schools
were there. The headquarters of the infantry and artillery corps were
there. Kaduna alone was home to the headquarters of the 1st Division of
the Nigerian Army, Defense Industries Corporation of Nigeria (Army
Depot), Air Force Training School and, Nigerian Defence Academy.
Maitama Sule, Minister of Mines and Power in 1966, once told the
story of how Muhammadu Ribadu, his counterpart in Defence Ministry, went
to the Nigerian Military School, Zaria, and the British Commandant of
the school told him many of the students could not continue because they
failed woefully. When Ribadu thumbed through the list, Sule said, it
was a Mohammed, an Ibrahim, a Yusuf or an Abdullahi. “You don’t know
what you are doing and because of this you cannot continue to head the
school,” an irate Ribadu was said to have told the commandant.
Shehu Musa Yar’Adua was one of the students for whom the commandant
was sacked. “You can see what Yar’Adua later became in life. He became
the vice president. This is the power of forward planning,” Sule
declared.
Unknown to the forward planners, according to the US documents,
Ojukwu had been meticulously preparing for war as early as October 1966,
after the second round of massacre in the North. He had stopped the
Eastern share of revenues that were supposed to accrue to the Federation
Account. By 30 April 1967, he had recalled all Igbos serving in Nigeria
embassies and foreign missions and those that heeded his call were
placed on the payroll of the government of Eastern Region. The 77,000
square kilometres of the Republic of Biafra–a mere 8 per cent of the
size of Nigeria–was already divided into 20 provinces, with leaders
selected for each. They had their own judiciary, legislative councils,
ministries and ambassadors. Alouette helicopters and a B26 bomber were
procured from the French Air Force through a Luxemburg trading company.
Hank Warton, the German-American arms dealer, had been flying in Czech
and Israeli arms via Spain and Portugal since October 1966. The military
hardware, they could not get, they seized. A DC3 and a Fokker F27 were
seized from the Nigerian Air Force in April. NNS Ibadan, a Nigerian Navy
Seaward Defence Boat (SDB) that docked in Calabar Port, was quickly
made Biafran.
Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu, who was supposed to be in Enugu in prison
for his role in 1966 coup, joined in training recruits in Abakaliki.
Foreign mercenaries were training indoctrinated old people, young men
and teenagers recruited as NCOs [Non-commissioned Officers] in jungle
warfare, bomb making, mortar and other artillery firing. Ojukwu, through
speeches, town hall meetings, market square performances and radio
broadcasts, succeeded in convincing his people that their destiny was
death or a separate state. All his performances in Ghana that culminated
in the Aburi Accord of January 1967, or discussions with the
Awolowo-led National Conciliation Committee five months later, turned
out to be ruse.
The underground war preparations, the secret arms stockpiles openly
manifested themselves as Ojukwu’s stubborn refusal to accept offers or
concessions during these peace meetings.
But the Biafrans knew that their vulnerable line was along Ogoja,
Ikom, Calabar, Port Harcourt, and Yenogoa. Support from the six million
people making up the Eastern minorities was very much unsure. The
minorities viewed their leaders in Biafra high command as traitors. And
without the minorities, Biafra would be landlocked and most likely,
unviable as a state. More so, their vast oil and gas resources were the
reason they contemplated secession in the first place. The Biafra high
command believed that if there was going to be any troop incursion from
there, they are going to be transported through ship. They already had a
B26 bomber to deal fire to Nigeria’s only transport ship, NNS Lokoja,
anytime it approached the Biafran coastline.
The Biafrans also knew that Gowon wanted to respect the neutrality
of Midwest and not invade through Niger Bridge, which would have driven
the people of the Midwest into waiting Biafran hands. But if Gowon
changed his mind and there was a general mobilization of the two
battalions of the federal troops there, they had trustworthy men there
that would alert Enugu. And if that failed, according to the US
documents, the Niger Bridge had been mined using “explosives with metal
covering across the roadbed at second pier out from the eastern side”.
The Biafrans also knew that the Yoruba, who were sworn enemies of
the Northern hegemony, would never join the North militarily or
politically against the Biafrans. When Gowon vouched to “crush the
rebellion,” progressive Yoruba intellectuals deplored the language.
Professor Hezekiah Oluwasanmi, Vice Chancellor of University of Ife,
described the use of the word as unfortunate. Justice Kayode Eso of the
Western Court of Appeal said: “Crushing the East was not the way to make
Nigeria one.”
Mr. Strong, the American consul in Ibadan, whom they had been
speaking to, confidentially wrote: “As intellectuals and modernizers,
they see the conflict in terms of continuing determination of
conservative North to dominate the more advanced South and they
expressed fear that once North subdues East, it will seek to assert
outright dominance over the West. The centre of trouble might then swing
back to the West, where it all started.”
The Biafrans understood, therefore, that their strongest defence
perimeter would be along Nsukka, Obudu, Gakem and Nyonya in Ogoja
province, where they share border with the North. That was where they
concentrated. On 8 July after three days of fighting, only four Biafran
troops were dead and nine wounded in Obudu, while up to 100 Nigerian
troops were dead, according to the Irish Embassy official, Eamon
O’tuathail, who visited the Catholic Mission Hospital in Obudu. He said:
“Forty five (45) of the dead had already been buried and the villagers
were seen carrying the heads of the remaining around town.” In June
before fighting started, Ojukwu charged on Biafra Radio: “Each Biafran
soldier should bring back ten or twenty Hausa heads.”
At Nyanya, Nigerian troops attempted to seize the bridge linking
Obudu and Ogoja, but were beaten back by the Biafran troops on 7 July at
1400hrs. According to the New York Times’ Lloyd Garrison’s dispatch of 8
July: “The Biafran Air Force–a lone B-26 fighter bomber–flew sorties
from Enugu today, bombing and strafing enemy columns. Asked what damage
it had inflicted, its European pilot replied: “Frankly, I don’t know.
But we made a lot of smoke. Hundreds of Enugu pedestrians waved and
cheered each time the plane returned from a mission and swooped low over
the city buzzing Ogui Avenue.”
Tunde Akingbade of the Daily Times, who was returning from the
frontlines, said the first Nigerian battalion in Ogoja area was “almost
completely wiped out by a combination of mines and electrical devices
(Ogbunigwe)”.
In the first few weeks of the war, the Biafrans were clearly on
top. “Enugu is very calm,” the confidential cable of 13 July 1967 noted.
“Ojukwu is dining with Field Commanders in State House tonight.”
On the federal side, confusion reigned. They had grossly
underestimated Biafran capabilities. “Gowon and his immediate military
advisers believe they can carry out a successful operation putting their
trust in the superiority of the Hausa soldier,” the British High
Commissioner, Sir David Hunt, told his American counterpart on 31 May
1967. He said further: “A northern incursion would be hastily mounted,
ill-conceived and more in the nature of a foray.”
Even the Nigerian infantry, which advanced as far as Obolo on
Oturkpo-Nsukka Road, was easily repelled. It ran out of ammunition. At
the Supreme Headquarters in Lagos, they were accusing Shuwa, the
commander, of not sending enough information about what was going on.
Shuwa counter-accused that he was not getting enough and timely orders.
Requests for ammunition and hardware procurement were chaotically coming
to the Federal Armament Board from different units, not collectively
from the central command.
Major S.A. Alao, acting commander of Nigerian Air Force (after
George Kurubo defected to Biafran High Command) together with the German
adviser, Lieutenant Colonel Karl Shipp, had travelled to many European
cities to buy jets. They were unsuccessful. Gowon had written to the
American president for arms. The State Department declined military
assistance to either side. Gowon replied that he was not requesting for
assistance, but a right to buy arms from the American market. That too
was rejected.
The CIA had predicted a victory for Ojukwu, but American diplomatic
and consular corps in Nigeria predicted victory for the Federal side
and concluded that a united Nigeria served American interests better
than the one without the Eastern Region. Two conflicting conclusions
from an important department and a useful agency. The American
government chose to be neutral. Dean Rusk, America’s Secretary of State
said: “America is not in a position to take action as Nigeria is an area
under British influence.”
The British on the other hand were foot-dragging. At the insistence
of Awolowo, “the acting prime minister” as he was called in diplomatic
circles, Gowon approached the Soviet Union.
According to a secret cable (dated 24/08/67) sent by Dr. Martin
Hillenbrand, American Ambassador in East Germany, to his counterpart in
Lagos, MCK Ajuluchukwu, Ojukwu’s special envoy, met Soviet Ambassador to
Nigeria, Alexandr Romanov, in Moscow in June 1967. Romanov said that
for USSR to recognize Biafra and supply it arms, the latter had to
nationalize the oil industry. Ojukwu refused, saying that he had no
money to reimburse the oil companies and that Biafrans did not have the
expertise to run the oil installations.
A month later, Anthony Enahoro, the Federal Commissioner for
Information and Labour, went to Moscow, signed a cultural agreement with
Moscow and promised to nationalize the oil industry, including its
allied industries once they got arms to recapture them from the
Biafrans. Within days, 15 MiGs arrived in sections in Ikeja and Kano
airports, awaiting assemblage. There was no nationalization.
Meanwhile, buoyed by the confidence from early success, the
Biafrans went on the offensive. Their B26 (one of the six originally
intended for use against the Nigerian Navy) was fitted with multiple
canon and 50mm calibre machine gun mounts. It conducted bombing raids on
Makurdi airfield, Kano and Kaduna. Luckily for Nigeria, the two
transport DC3s had gone to Lagos to get more reserve mortar and
106-artillery ammo. In Kano, there were no fatalities, only a slight
damage to the wing of a commercial plane.
Kaduna, however, was not that lucky. On 10 August 1967, the B26
dropped bombs on Kaduna airbase, damaging many buildings and the main
hangar. The German consulate in Kaduna confirmed that a German citizen, a
Dornier technician tasked with maintaining Nigerian military planes,
was killed and two others injured.
A week later, the senior traffic control officer, A.O. Amaku, was
arrested for sabotage. He was accused of failing to shut off the
airport’s homing device, thus giving the Biafran plane navigational
assistance. His British assistant, Mr. Palfrey, was similarly suspected.
He resigned and immediately returned to the UK. However, Major Obada,
the airbase commanding officer and an Urhobo from the Midwest, strongly
defended the accused.
The daring bomb raid provoked many more Northern civilians to run to the nearest army base and enlist to fight.
According to a report by US Ambassador Elbert Matthews, cabled to
Washington on 3 July 1967, unidentified men tried to bomb the police
headquarters in Lagos on the night of 2 July. They attempted to drive an
automobile into the compound, but the guards did not open the gate.
They packed the car across the street near a small house opposite a
petrol station. Leaving the car, the men fled and within seconds, an
explosion took place. The house was demolished and all its occupants
killed, but the petrol station was unaffected. Eleven people, including
some of the guards at the police headquarters, were injured.
Two hours later, a second explosion, from explosives in a car
parked by a petrol station, rocked Yaba. This time, the station caught
fire. The ambassador remarked: “It is possible this is a start of
campaign of terrorism…public reactions could further jeopardize safety
of Ibos in Lagos.” And sure it did.
A Lagos resident, who visited the police headquarters after the attack, told the Australian ambassador “Ibos must be killed.”
There was panic all over Lagos. Anti-Igbo riots broke out. Northern
soldiers at the 2nd Battalion Barracks in Ikeja used the opportunity to
launch a mini-version of the previous year’s torture and massacre of
the Igbo in the North. On 7 July 1967, Lagos State governor, Lieutenant
Colonel Mobolaji Johnson, condemned the bombing in a radio broadcast. “A
good number of Igbos in Lagos is innocent and loyal to the federal
government. It is only fair that they be allowed to go about their
business unmolested so long as they abide by the law and are not agents
and evildoers,” Johnson said.
He called for Lagosians to join civil defence units and for Easterners to come and register with the police.
Meanwhile, the corpses of troops and soldiers wounded in Yahe,
Wakande, Obudu and Gakem that arrived Kaduna by train on 11 July 1967
sparked enormous interest in enlistment and volunteering. Recruitment
centres were established in Ibadan, Enugu, Lagos and Kano. But it was at
the Kano centre, headquarters of the 4th Battalion of the Nigerian
Regiment that generated the biggest number of recruits. According to the
US confidential cable of 17 July 1967, 20,000 of these were veterans,
who had been recruited to fight on the British side in Burma. The Burma
veterans marched angrily to the recruitment offices to replace those
that had been killed or injured. Around 7,000 were accepted. Of these,
5,000 were immediately sent to the frontline. They said they needed no
training; only guns.
As they advanced, towards the outskirts of Ikem, 4km southeast of
Nsukka, when mortal fires from the Biafran artillery landed close by,
inexperienced recruits ducked for cover behind their transport columns
out of fear and incompetence in bush warfare. Not these Burma veterans.
Damboa, the Regional Editor of the Morning Post, was embedded with some
of these veterans under the command of Major Shande, formerly of the 5th
Battalion, Kano, which Ojukwu commanded in 1963.
One day, at about 2a.m, Biafran forces began firing from the jungle
in the hope of drawing a return fire if the enemy was ahead. “But the
veterans were too smart and began to creep towards the source of firing.
After some time, the Biafran troops began to advance thinking that
there were no federal troops ahead since there was no return of fire.
They walked straight into the pointing guns of these veterans, their
fingers squeezed the triggers,” said Damboa to a US Consulate officer
named Arp.
These veterans were shooting at innocent Igbo civilians, too.
Damboa further told Arp, when he came back from the frontlines on 17
September 1967, that “federal troops were shooting most Ibo civilians on
sight, including women and children except for women with babies in
their arms. Initially they observed the rules laid down by Gowon on the
treatment of civilians. Then, after the takeover of the Midwest, they
heard stories that Ibo soldiers had killed all the northerners they
found residing in the Midwest. Since that time, Federal troops have been
shooting Ibo civilians on sight,” added Damboa.
The Midwest Invasion
Something was happening to Biafran soldiers, which the Federal
troops observed but could not explain. Indeed, the fortunes of the
Federal troops were improving. Colonel Benjamin Adekunle’s 3rd Marine
Commando had landed on 25 July 1967 at Bonny Island, establishing a
heavy presence of federal forces in the creeks. Two L29 Delfins fighter
jets from Czechoslovakia (NAF 401 and NAF 402) were at the Ikeja Airport
and battle ready.
Five more, on board Polish vessel Krakow, were a week away from the
Apapa Ports. Major Lal, an ammunition ordnance officer seconded from
the Indian Army to Nigeria, had arrived from Eastern Europe, where he
had gone to acquire information necessary to utilize Czech aerial
ordnance. Sections of 15 Soviet MiG bombers hidden in NAF hangars were
being assembled by 40 Russian technicians lodging in Central Hotel,
Kano. Bruce Brent of Mobil Oil was flying jet oil to Kano to fuel these
bombers. Captain N.O. Sandburg of Nigerian Airlines had flown in seven
pilots, who had previously done mercenary work in South Africa and
Congo, to fly the MiGs. Names, birthdates and passport numbers of 26
Russians, who were to serve as military advisors had been passed to
Edwin Ogbu, Permanent Secretary, External Affairs Ministry. They were in
Western Europe awaiting a direct flight to Lagos.
But George Kurubo, the Federal Air Force Chief of Staff, who had
earlier joined the Biafran high command, had defected back to the fold
and had been sent to Moscow as ambassador to facilitate the flow of more
arms from the Soviets.
Lt. Colonel Oluwole Rotimi, Quartermaster-General of the Nigerian Army, went to western Europe with a fat chequebook.
What followed was the arrival of Norwegian ship, Hoegh Bell,
bearing 2,000 cases of ammunition; and British ship, Perang, which
discharged its own 2000 cases of ammunition. A German ship Suderholm
also arrived. Those in charge of it claimed she was in Apapa to offload
gypsum. But the US defense attaché reported that it was carrying “300
tonnes of 60mm and 90mm ammo.” The Ghanaian vessel, Sakumo Lagoon, was
already in Lome, heading to Apapa to discharge its own ammo. A cache of
1,000 automatic fabriquenationale rifles had arrived Lagos by air on 8
August 1967 from the UK.
Speaking secretly to UK Defence Attaché, Lt. Colonel Ikwue said he
too had gone to the German Defence Firm, Merex, to buy ammunition: 106mm
US recoilless rifles at $86 per round; 84mm ammo for the Carl Gustav
recoilless rifles at $72 per round; 105mm HEAT- High Explosive Anti-Tank
warheads at $47 per round. Ikwue also bought three English Electra
Canberra, eight Mark II Bombers at $105,000 each, 15 Sabre MK VI-T33
Jets at $100,000 each.
With all of these, Awolowo, rejected Hassan Katsina’s request for
funding of 55, 000 more rifles for new recruits. However, he agreed once
Gowon intervened and assured him it was not a request inspired by
fraudulent intentions.
Federal troops had captured Nsukka, 56km from Enugu. Over 200
non-Igbo Biafran policemen had fled across the Mamfe border into
Cameroun. In Ogoja, the Ishibori, Mbube and other non-Igbo Biafrans
welcomed the federal troops after driving out the Biafran troops in a
fierce battle.
The Biafrans blew up the bridge over the Ayim River at Mfume as they retreated.
The momentum was with the Federal side, but they knew their
victories were not only because of their military superiority. At
critical stages of battle, even when the Biafrans were clearly winning,
they suddenly withdrew. An instance was on 15 July 1967, to the west of
Nsukka on the route to Obolo. According to a conversation Colonel J.R.
Akahan, Nigeria’s Chief of Army Staff, had with British Defence Advisor,
the Nigerian infantry companies of the 4th Battalion, totally unaware
of the presence of the 8th Battalion of the Biafran army, were buried
under a hail of bullets and mortar.
Yet, the Biafran forces began to retreat. This enabled the remnants
of the federal infantry company to regroup and successfully
counter-attack. Even more senior Biafran commanders that should have
been aware that the area had come under federal control were driving
into the arms of the federal side. Nzeogwu and Tome Bigger (Ojukwu’s
half-brother) were victims of the mysterious happening. Ojukwu initially
put this down to breakdown of communication in the chain of command.
During a special announcement over Biafran radio on 15 July 1967, Ojukwu
said: “Yesterday, a special attack, which would have completely sealed
the doom of enemy troops in the Nsukka sector of the northern front, was
ruthlessly sabotaged by a mysterious order from the army high
command…Our valiant troops were treacherously exposed to enemy flanks.”
At 9.30p.m on 8 August 1967, Biafran forces invaded the Midwest. In
the recollection of Major (Dr.) Albert Nwazu Okonkwo, military
administrator of Midwest, made available in confidence through an
American teacher living in Asaba to Clinton Olson, Deputy Chief of
Mission in Lagos on 1 November 1967, it was known by 4 August 1967 in
Asaba that the Midwest, West and Lagos would soon be invaded.
On 5 August, Ojukwu had warned the Midwest government, headed by
Colonel David Ejoor, that if northern troops were allowed to stay in the
Midwest, the region would become a battleground. Many Midwestern
officers knew of the plans; some of them had gone to Biafra earlier to
help in the preparations. Lt Col. Nwawo, Commander of the Fourth Area
Command at Benin, was probably aware. Lt Col. Okwechime, according to
the document, certainly knew of it. Lt Col. Nwajei did not know and was
never trusted by the anti-Lagos elements in the Midwest. “After the
Biafran takeover, Nwajei was sent back to his village of Ibusa, where he
was said to be engaged in repainting his home until just the arrival of
Nigerian troops in the area,” disclosed the document.
Major Albert Okonkwo, later appointed military administrator, did
not know in advance. Lieutenant (later Major) Joseph Isichei and
Lieutenant Colonel Chukwurah were not informed in advance. “Major Samuel
Ogbemudia participated in the invasion, properly by prior agreement,”
the document stated.
That night of 8 August, Biafran army units blazed across the
Onitsha Bridge and disarmed the Asaba garrison that was then stationed
at St Peter’s Teachers’ Training College. Then they went on to the
Catering Rest House, where Midwest officers were living, and disarmed
the officers. The only exception was Major Asama, the local commander,
who escaped and drove to Agbor at about 22.30hrs.
There were no casualties except for one officer with a gunshot
wound in the leg. The invading force drove to Agbor, where it split into
three columns. One column drove northwards towards Auchi and
Aghenebode. A second column went to Warri and Sapele.
“The main force led by Victor Banjo was supposed to drive on to
Benin and capture Ijebu-Ode, reach Ibadan on 9 August, reach Ikeja near
Lagos by 10 August, setting up a blockade there to seal off the capital
city,” the document quoted Okonkwo as saying.
However, this main column stopped in Agbor for six hours, reaching
Benin at dawn. There was no real resistance in Benin, where no civilian
was killed. The main column left Benin for Ijebu-Ode early in the
afternoon. It stopped at Ore, just at the Western Region’s border.
According to US Defense Attaché report, three weeks before, Ejoor
informed the Supreme Headquarters that he had information that Ojukwu
was planning to send soldiers in mufti to conquer the Midwest. So, the
3rd Battalion, which was heading towards the Okene – Idah route to join
the 1st Division on the Nsukka frontline, was ordered to stop at Owo.
The first Recce Squadron from Ibadan, which had already reached Okene,
was reassigned to take care of any surprise in the Midwest. By the time
Lagos heard of the invasion, this squadron was quickly upgraded from
company strength to a battalion, with troops of Shuwa’s 1st Division
across the river, and another battalion was stationed at Idah to hold a
defensive alignment against any Biafran surprise from Auchi.
Upon receiving the telephone call from Major Asama about the
Biafran invasion at Asaba, Ejoor hurriedly left his wife and children at
the State House, went to his friend, Dr Albert Okonkwo at Benin
Hospital to borrow his car. He then sought asylum in the home of
Catholic Bishop of Benin, Patrick Kelly.
In his first radio address to the people of Midwest on 9 August
1967, Banjo said Ejoor was safe and “efforts were being made to enlist
his continued service in Midwest and in Nigeria.” Ejoor stayed in the
seminary next door to the bishop’s house for almost two weeks, receiving
visitors including Banjo, Colonels Nwawo and Nwajei, Major (Dr.)
Okonkwo, who were trying to persuade him to make a speech supporting the
new administration.
Ejoor refused. He was told that he was free to go wherever he
wished without molestation. Not trusting what they might do, he went
back to Isoko his native area, where he remained till federal forces
captured it on 22 September 1967.
Before Banjo knew the full score, he met with Mr. Bell, UK Deputy
High Commissioner, the evening of Benin invasion. Bell summarized his
and Banjo’s words as:
a. There were no fatal casualties though some were wounded.
b. Ejoor and two senior officers were not in Benin when Eastern
troops arrived. Bell had firm impression that they had been warned about
the day’s event.
c. All the Midwest is now under the control of combined East/Midwest forces.
d. East was asked to cooperate by certain Midwest officers because an invasion of the Midwest by the North was imminent.
e. That he does not agree with Ojukwu on the separate existence of Biafra. He is convinced that a united Nigeria is essential.
f. Bell said he saw only three officers at the army headquarters:
one was a Midwestern medical officer (Major Okoko). All others were
Easterners.
Meanwhile when Banjo made the first radio address, he announced the
impending appointment of a military administrator, but there was
considerable difficulty among the Biafran and Midwestern leaders in
selecting a suitable man.
First choice was to be someone from the Ishan or Afemai areas.
Someone from the Delta was next, preferably an Ika-Igbo. However, the
stalemate continued until Ojukwu intervened and selected Albert Okonkwo.
Ojukwu knew Okonkwo only by reputation.
Okonkwo had certain things that recommended him. First, he had an
American wife, which cut the family/tribe relationship problem of those
times in half. Second, he was considered to be politically “sterile,”
having been in the US for 13 years and was not associated with any
political party or faction. Third, he was commissioned a captain in the
medical corps on 2 October 1965 and just made a Major on 22 June 1967.
The implication was that he was not tainted by army politics. He was
also very pro-Biafra.
As soon as Okonkwo became military administrator, Banjo was
recalled to Enugu to explain the failure of the military campaign.
During his absence, the Midwest Administration was established (an
Advisory Council and an Administrative Council). Banjo succeeded in
convincing Biafran leaders in Enugu that his halt at Ore had been
dictated by military expediency. He then returned to the Midwest front.
Banjo informed Okonkwo of the military situation through Major Isichei,
Chief of Staff of the Midwest. Isichei later commented that he had
noticed that Banjo’s headquarters staff never discussed plans or
operations in his presence. Through Isichei, Banjo told Okonkwo that
Auchi had been lost after a fierce battle when, in fact, it was not
defended at all.
Suspicions began to thicken around Banjo. Okonkwo, in a
confidential statement made available to the Americans, said he also
noticed that Banjo obtained money by requisition from him for materials,
food and officers salaries’, thus drawing on the Midwest treasury. On
19 September, when Okonkwo telephoned Enugu, he discovered from the
Biafran Army HQ that Banjo was simultaneously drawing funds from Biafra
for all these supplies. Okonkwo sent Major Isichei to arrest Banjo for
embezzlement, but they found that he had already left Benin and had left
orders for all Midwest and Biafran soldiers to fall back to Agbor.
Okonkwo ordered his Midwest government to move from Benin to Asaba,
which it did that day. The seat of the government was behind the
textile factory, in homes once inhabited by expatriates. In August,
Okonkwo tape-recorded five broadcasts to be used when possible. Those
included the Declaration of Independence and the Proclamation of the
Republic of Benin, as well as a decree setting up a Benin Central Bank, a
Benin University, etc. The Republic of Benin Proclamation was delayed
while the consent of the Oba of Benin was sought. Finally, just when the
Oba had been convinced that the Republic was “best for his people,” the
actions of Banjo were discovered and the Midwest seemed about to be
lost, or at least Benin was undefended. Okonkwo went ahead with the
broadcast early on 20 September 1967 in order to record for history that
the Midwest was separate from Biafra. It was the last act of his
government in Benin.
Early afternoon on 9 August, Banjo’s main force left Benin for
Ijebu-Ode. It was composed of both Biafran and Midwest units. Midwest
troops, who were mostly Igbo, had joined the “liberation army”.
Commanding the Midwest forces with Banjo was Major Samuel Ogbemudia, who
had been nursing the idea of defection. When the troops reached Ore and
halted, Ogbemudia disappeared to later rejoin the Nigerian Army. Lt.
Col Bisalla, acting Chief of Army Staff, confirmed that Ogbemudia, in
the morning of 9 August, telephoned him precisely at 7:20am to inform
him of the “trouble in Benin.”
According to Standish Brooks, the US Defense Attaché, Ogbemudia was
the first Nigerian officer to attend American Military School’s
counterinsurgency course in Fort Bragg, 1961. Brooks said after his
arrival in Lagos on 9 September 1967, Ogbemudia said: “He escaped with a
small group of non-Ibo troops from the Benin garrison and have been
waging a guerrilla warfare against Eastern units. Having run out of
ammo, he made his way back to Lagos.”
Army Headquarters believed him and Brooks’ report further stated:
“Ogbemudia would be sent to the headquarters of Second Division in Auchi
to assist in operational planning because of his intimate knowledge of
the Midwest area and his recent experience in the Midwest under Eastern
control.”
From 20 September onwards, the Midwest and Biafran Army began to
fall apart. The 17th Battalion in Ikom mutinied and fled. So did the
12th and 16th Battalion in the Midwest.
In the evening of 22 September, the Midwest paymaster, Col. Morah,
from Eze near Onicha Olona, offered an American expatriate in Asaba £3,
000 if the American would arrange for Morah to get $5,000 upon his
arrival in the United States. This would have been a profit of about $3,
400 to the American. The offer was refused. Later on September 25,
Morah disappeared with £33, 000, the document said. This was the time
six NAF planes went on reconnaissance and reported back to the Defence
Headquarters that they had noticed “heavy movements of civilians over
the bridge from Asaba to Onitsha,” but did not have the details. On 27
September, Okonkwo called a meeting of all Midwest civil servants, where
he said if the Nigerian Army reached Agbor, he would close the Onitsha
Bridge. He would not let the civil servants abandon the population of
Asaba to the inevitable massacre when the Federal Army reached the town.
The people of Asaba knew by this time of the killings of Igbos in Benin
when the federal forces reached it on 20 September. Everyone assumed
that it would happen in Asaba.
From 20 September, there were no Biafran soldiers stationed west of Umunede, east of Agbor.
On 1 October, Midwest commanders in Umunede and Igueben, south of
Ubiaja on the Auchi-Agbor Road, fled from their positions. Their Biafran
subordinates promptly retreated. Constant streams of retreating Biafran
and Midwest troops filed through Asaba on 2 and 3 October. The Biafrans
were usually mounted in vehicles, while the Midwesterners had to walk.
The attitude of the Biafran soldiers and officers was that they would
not fight for the Midwest if the Midwest Army did not want to fight. In
Asaba on 2 October, the elders and chiefs met to consider sending a
delegation to the approaching Nigerian Army to surrender the town and
ask for protection in return for help in finding and capturing Biafran
soldiers in the town. Cadet Uchei, who brought soldiers to stop the
delegation with death threats, thwarted this effort. At this time, some
35 non-Igbos were rounded up and given shelter at St. Patrick’s College,
Asaba.
Twice, Cadet Uchei brought soldiers to kill the refugees and arrest
the Americans in charge of the school. On the first occasion, Lt.
Christian Ogbulo, ADC to Okonkwo, stopped the attempt. Cadet Williams
from Ogwashi-Uku brought soldiers to rescue only the Americans from
Uchei’s second attempt. Also on 2 October, Col. Chukwurah, who had been
the commanding officer at Agbor, came to Asaba and told the Midwest Army
HQ staff that he had overthrown Okonkwo and he was now military
governor of the Midwest. Chukwurah fled across the bridge to Biafra
before nightfall.
Only two of the officers of the Midwest Army were known not to have
fled from battle during the campaign: Major Joe Isichei (who was a
Lieutenant on August 9) and Lt-Col. Joe Achuzia. Gathering a few
soldiers, they attempted to shoot their way out. Okwechime was seen in
Onitsha at this time; he had been wounded. By the evening of 2 October,
the Midwest Army was completely dissolved.
From 6 a.m on 4 October, machine gun-and mortar fire was heard near
Asaba, but the direction was uncertain. It was later discovered that
the firing came from Asaba-Isele-Uku Road. At about 1p.m, as the staff
members of St. Patrick’s College were leaving the dining room, the first
mortar shell landed on the school football field. Mortar shelling
continued until dusk. Federal troops reached the northern edge of the
campus, along the Asaba-Agbor Road, at about 5p.m. By noon of 5 October,
there were six battalions lining up on the road in front of the
college, according to Captain Johnson, who was third in command of the
71st Battalion. By the evening of 6 October, Federal forces held the
road all the way into the Catholic Mission, two miles inside Asaba.
Biafran resistance west of the Niger was over.
Major Alani Akinrinade commanded the 71st Battalion. (Akinrinade in
a clarification, said his command was the 6th Brigade and truly he was
in Asaba at this time.
His second in command was a Tiv officer, older than Alani. The men
of this battalion were mostly Yoruba and Tiv, with some Delta (Ijaw)
men. “Most spoke English. They were disciplined, courageous and polite,”
the American report stated.
Captain Johnson ordered the Americans to leave Asaba by the morning
of 6 October. The reason was understood to be that the 71st Battalion
was unable to guarantee their safety from the “second wave” of federal
soldiers, known as “the Sweepers” coming behind. “The Sweepers” were
only briefly observed, but they wore long hair, had “cross-hatching
tribal marks on both cheeks” and apparently willing to live up to their
reputation as “exterminators.” According to secret cables sent from
American embassies in Niger and Chad to the Embassy and consulates in
Nigeria, thousands of Nigeriens and Chadians crossed the border to
enlist for the war.
Ten trucks of Nigerien soldiers were seen being transported for
service in the Nigerian Army from Gusau to Kaduna and over 2,000 more
waiting on Niger-Nigeria border for transportation to Kaduna. The secret
document went on: “1,000 Chadian soldiers passed through Maiduguri en
route Kaduna. These mercenary soldiers constituted the “Sweepers.” The
captured American teachers aptly observed that there were soldiers
regarded as fighting soldiers and there were other units that came
behind to conduct mass exterminations.
Major Alani, it was understood, was trying to get as many civilians as possible into the bush before the sweepers could arrive.
On the 5 October, when they came, a lieutenant attempted to arrest
the American teachers at St. Patrick’s College and their non-Igbo
refugees, who had hidden from retreating but still vicious Biafran
troops.
Captain Johnson quickly summoned Major Alani. The lieutenant
claimed to be acting for a “Major Jordane,” but a check proved this as
false. Alani sent the lieutenant and his men away and posted a guard to
the school until the staff and refugees left Asaba. There were too many
civilians to be executed that Captain Paul Ogbebor and his men were
asked to get rid of a group of several hundred Asaba citizens rounded up
on 7 October. Not wanting to risk insubordination, he marched the
contingent into the bush, told the people to run and had his men fire
harmlessly into the ground. Eyewitness accounts confirmed that he
performed the same life-saving deception in Ogwashi-Uku.
However, other civilian contingents the sweepers rounded up were
shot behind the Catholic Mission and their bodies thrown into the Niger
River. This incident and many others were reported to Colonel Arthur
Halligan, the US military attaché in Nigeria at that time, the document
concluded.
At night on 19 September, Banjo was arrested in Agbor. He was court
martialed in Enugu three days later. Okonkwo participated in the
court-martial and Ojukwu was present too. Banjo was found guilty,
together with Emmanuel Ifeajuna (“the man from Ilaah who shot Abubakar”
–the Prime Minister), Phillip Alale and Sam Agbam.
Bob Barnard, American consul in Enugu, said Ojukwu told him that he
ordered the killing of Banjo, Ifeajuna, Alale and Agbam because they
had planned to oust him from office, oust Gowon as well and install
Awolowo as Prime Minister. The American military attaché, Arthur
Halligan and Brooks, the Defense Attaché who had some prior intimation
of the coup cabled the Defense Intelligence Agency in Washington 3
August 1967 that “in the long run, Njoku will unseat Ojukwu.”
Ojukwu told Barnard: “The plotters intended to take Brigadier
Hillary Njoku, the head of Biafran Army into custody and bring him to
the State House under heavy armed guard ostensibly to demand of him that
Njoku be relieved of command on the grounds of incompetence.” They had
been behind the withdrawal of troops and reverses of prior Biafran
victories. He continued: “Once inside the State House, Njoku’s guards
would be used against him. Ifeajuna would then declare himself acting
Governor and offer ceasefire on Gowon’s terms. Banjo would go to the
West and replace Brigadier Yinka Adebayo, the military governor of
Western Region. Next, Gowon would be removed and Awolowo declared Prime
Minister of Reunited Federation…Victor Banjo, Ifeajuna and others kept
in touch with co-conspirators in Lagos via British Deputy High
Commission’s facilities in Benin.”
When the American consul asked Ojukwu for evidence, Ojukwu replied:
“Banjo is a very meticulous man who kept records and notes of
everything he did. The mistake of the plotters was they talked too much,
their moves too conspicuous and they made notes. As a result, the
conspirators came under surveillance from the early stages of the plot’s
existence. Their plans then became known and confirmed by subsequent
events.”
In a separate document, Clint Olson, American Deputy Chief of
Mission wrote: “Much of the information recounted came from Major (Dr.)
Okonkwo. Banjo freely admitted in his testimony that a group of Yorubas
on both sides of the battle were plotting together to take over Lagos
and Enugu governments and unite Nigeria under Chief Awolowo. Gowon,
Ojukwu, and Okonkwo were to be eliminated; Gowon was to have been killed
by Yoruba officers in the Federal Army.”
The document stated further: “When arrested on the night of 19 –
20th September, Banjo offered no resistance because he said then it was
too late to stop the affair and the plot was already in motion. His
role, Banjo said, was already accomplished. As far as is known, Banjo
died without revealing the names of his collaborators in Lagos.”
Before Banjo got to Enugu after his arrest, Okonkwo had telephoned
Gowon to warn him of a threat to his life. Okonkwo said he was afraid
that the assassination of Gowon would prevent the Heads of State Mission
of the Organization of African Unity from coming to Nigeria. The OAU
mission held the best hope of resolving the war, Okonkwo believed.
Whether Ojukwu knew of or agreed with Okonkwo’s warning to Gowon
was not known. However according to the American Olson, roadblocks
appeared in many places in Lagos and were severely enforced. They were
removed after about 48 hours as mysteriously as they had appeared.
Gowon, in an exclusive interview with New Nigeria after Banjo
revealed himself as the head of an invading army, said he once met Banjo
and Ojukwu in 1965 during the crisis that followed the 1964
parliamentary elections. They were discussing the merits of the army
taking over governance.
– Next WeeK: Part Two of the Biafran story
Credits: Damola Awoyokun/London
0 comments:
Post a Comment